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ABSTRACT 
Safety culture in the construction industry is a growing research area.  The unique nature of construction 
industry works – being project-based, varying in size and focus, and relying on a highly transient subcontractor 
workforce – means that safety culture initiatives cannot be easily translated from other industries.  This paper 
reports on the first study in a three year collaborative industry and university research project focusing on safety 
culture practices and development in one of Australia’s largest global construction organisations.  The first 
round of a modified Delphi method is reported, and describes the insights gained from 41 safety leaders’ 
perceptions and understandings of safety culture within the organisation. In-depth, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted, and will be followed by a quantitative perception survey with the same sample.  Participants 
included Senior Executives, Corporate Managers, Project Managers, Safety Managers and Site Supervisors. 
Leaders’ definitions and descriptions of safety culture were primarily action-oriented and some confusion was 
evident due to the sometimes implicit nature of culture in organisations. Leadership was identified as a key 
factor for positive safety culture in the organisation, and there was an emphasis on leaders demonstrating 
commitment to safety, and being visible to the project-based workforce.  Barriers to safety culture improvement 
were also identified, with managers raising diverse issues such as the transient subcontractor workforce and the 
challenge of maintaining safety as a priority in the absence of safety incidents, under high production pressures. 
This research is unique in that it derived safety culture descriptions from key stakeholders within the 
organisation, as opposed to imposing traditional conceptualisations of safety culture that are not customised for 
the organisation or the construction industry more broadly. This study forms the foundation for integrating 
safety culture theory and practice in the construction industry, and will be extended upon in future studies within 
the research program.    
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INTRODUCTION 
While the role safety culture plays in the construction industry is the subject of a growing body of research, in 
practice the dynamic nature of the industry continues to test existing safety culture approaches. This paper 
presents the first part of a three year collaborative industry and university research project focusing on safety 
culture in one of Australia’s largest construction organisations. The research program takes a formative 
approach to investigating safety culture, encompassing both the theoretical literature and the importance of 
industry-derived understandings of culture.    
Workplace safety incidents 
It is estimated that 640,700 persons suffer a work related injury each year in Australia [1], and the economic 
cost of work related injuries in Australia is estimated to be approximately $38.3 billion each year, based on the 
most recent available data [2].  In addition to the economic costs, work related injuries also have social and 
business impacts, such as loss of goodwill and business reputation, as well as considerable impact on the 
individual’s family networks.   
Similar to the UK and US, the Australian construction industry is over-represented in the occupational injury 
and death statistics. There were 40 fatalities recorded in the preliminary data for 2008–09, which was the highest 
number of fatalities of all industries. This corresponds to a fatality rate of 5.9 fatalities per 100 000 employees in 
2008–09, which is more than twice the rate of 2.3 for all industries [3]. In addition, the construction industry 
accounted for 11% of all serious workers’ compensation claims, equating to 40 employees each day requiring 
one or more weeks off work because of work-related injury or disease.   
The economic and social costs of workplace incidents are being tackled by industry on several fronts; and safety 
culture is now broadly acknowledged as a significant concept in workplace health and safety approaches.  
Nature of the construction industry 
Whilst the causes of workplace accidents in the construction industry vary, the context in which construction 
work is carried out is an important factor in workplace safety incidents [4].   Construction industry workers are 
exposed to significant hazards and risks as part of their everyday work - such as working at height, working 
around mobile plant and live traffic, working with underground and above ground services - and many of these 
are well-identified and managed through project risk procedures. However, the reality of construction work is 
that these hazards are present in a dynamic and diverse environment where each job presents a unique 
combination of situation, person and task factors.  
Construction work is project-based, with works lasting anywhere from a week to a few years, making the 
establishment and maintenance of work group identities difficult. The type of work is also varied, with 
construction work including commercial and residential buildings, roads and motorways, tunnels and bridges, 
railway lines, electrical, gas and water services, and work in open-cut mines. In addition, the construction 
industry operates in a contractor environment, where primary project contractors often employ subcontractors, 
to the extent of up to 90% of the workforce on any given project [5]. This means that the majority of the 
workforce is highly transient, with regular movement between construction companies, projects, and sites, 
which adds to the already dynamic working environment and the subsequent risk exposure for workers. Taken 
together, is it clear that although the hazards may seem simple to identify, managing safety on a construction 
project is not a simple task, and the complexity of the work type and workforce presents a challenge to safety 
professionals and management.  
Safety culture origins 
Safety culture rose to the forefront of industry’s collective mind after the Chernobyl nuclear incident of 1986 
and the subsequent reports by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, published by the International 
Atomic Energy Authority [6], [7]. The definition put forward by IAEA describes safety culture as “that 
assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive attention warranted by their significance”. In a report to the UK 
Health and Safety Commission, the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations [8] defined the 
safety culture of an organisation in a more explicit manner as “...the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety management”.  
The realisation that systems were only one part of the safety ‘picture’ in organisations sparked a focus on human 
factors and human error approaches to managing the risks of organisational incidents and accidents [9]. Safety 
culture became a term that was accepted in both ‘technical’ fields such as engineering, construction, oil and 
mining [10], [11], as well as health fields [12], [13] and academia [14].  In particular, the academic literature has 
studied safety culture primarily from the social psychological and organisational psychological traditions, and 
there is a plethora of research exploring attitudes and perceptions of organisational members, and the somewhat 
sketchy links with safety performance outcomes [15], [16].  
Fragmented nature of the safety culture field 
Glendon [17] describes the concept of safety culture as problematic, with definitions often blurred and 
inconsistently applied.  Some view safety culture as a desired state which is rarely attained [9], whereas others 
view safety culture as a continuum whereby organisations are placed according to the extent to which safety is a 
part of their core business and practices [12].  Still others debate whether safety culture is something 
organisations ‘are’ or ‘have’ [14] [15], a distinction questioning the inherent nature of an organisation’s culture 
and its manifestation in policies and practices.  In a review of safety culture theory and research between 1980 
and 2000, Guldenmund [15] cites at least 18 different definitions of the safety culture/safety climate construct, 
highlighting the fragmented nature of the field.  Cooper [14] suggests that the broadness of safety culture 
definitions to date has contributed to the inconsistent operationalisation of the concept, and a heavy reliance on 
safety climate as a surrogate measure for safety culture.  This approach often ignores the behavioural aspects of 
safety culture which industry is arguably most interested in, and most able to influence in the workplace.  
Despite this, whichever definition is employed, scholars agree that safety culture is an important concept [15] 
[16].   
In addition to definitional difficulties, the factors that comprise safety culture are also frequently debated in the 
literature. Early empirical research on safety culture and climate focused on exploring its multi-dimensional 
nature [18] [10] [19]. In one of the earliest studies on safety climate, Zohar [19] proposed an eight-factor model, 
which was later tested and refined to a three-factor model [18]. Interestingly, of the studies reviewed by 
Guldenmund [15], the majority were exploratory, and those that were confirmatory did not support previous 
factor structures, further highlighting the disparity in safety culture descriptions.  In a study with construction 
workers, two factors were found to provide the best fit: management’s commitment to safety, and worker’s 
involvement in safety [10]. Later studies on the role of safety leadership and management corroborate this result 
[5], [20], [6], [16]. Furthermore, research on the role of communication [16] and quality of relationships [21] 
that safety culture is a complex construct.  
Practical application of safety culture 
Whilst the academic literature has struggled to define, describe and measure safety culture, high-risk industries 
have been applying the concept to their safety practices for decades [22], [7]. In Australia, the mining industry 
has adopted safety culture assessment tools and programs [23], and more recently considerable work has been 
undertaken in the construction industry [20], [24], [25] and in the road safety field [26], [27]. Safety culture is 
increasingly being recognised as a useful concept for understanding and manipulating the processes through 
which organisational leaders influence frontline workers [20].  
However, from an industry perspective, questions remain regarding the gap between the operationalisation of 
the elements of safety culture and their link to safety outcomes, particularly at different levels within an 
organisation. Furthermore, there remains specifically the need to develop pathways to operationalise and 
implement behaviour and organisational change based on the core elements of safety culture within an 
organisation.  Measuring key attitudes and behaviours that contribute to safety culture is important.  However, 
these constructs must not only inform safety interventions but importantly have the ability to establish and shape 
effective change programs within organisations. 
This paper reports on the first stage in a research program designed to explore safety culture in a large 
Australian construction company, with a view to understanding how safety culture theory and practice can be 
integrated to improve safety culture and related outcomes within the construction industry. In line with 
Guldenmund’s advice [28], the research takes participatory approach to investigating safety culture, using a mix 
of qualitative and quantitative methods. Gaining an understanding of organisational safety leaders’ perceptions 
of safety culture in this first stage ensures that the key stakeholders in the organisation have involvement 
throughout the process and improves both the relevance of, and compliance with, the resulting intervention. 
Specifically, the research questions for this stage of the program were: How is safety culture understood and 
described by the experts in the organisation? What are the key factors and barriers to safety culture as 
understood by the organisation’s safety leaders? 
METHOD 
An exploratory approach was considered most appropriate for this study as it was seeking to investigate safety 
culture perceptions of key organisational members. In depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews were 
conducted with a panel of safety leaders. Qualitative interviewing is a useful technique for assessing attitudes, 
perceptions and values as these are things that are difficult to observe in situ [29]. The interviews represent the 
first round of exploration, with a quantitative online questionnaire to be distributed to the same participants 
following the interviews. The questionnaire will be designed to clarify themes raised in the interviews, making 
the two methods complementary.  
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods with a panel of experts could be considered a 
modified-Delphi method. Linstone and Turoff [30] provide an underlying definition of the method: “Delphi may 
be characterised as a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in 
allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem.” The Delphi technique is a 
structured method used to gain consensus from a panel of experts [31], [32]. The process involves a number of 
‘rounds’ in which participants respond to questionnaires with the aim of reaching consensus in the final round. 
Traditional Delphi methods usually include three or four rounds of surveys, with each round providing the same 
information as the previous, but with group statistical data included. Each panel member then has an opportunity 
to amend their responses in light of the group data, making it an iterative process [30].   
More recently, the Delphi method has been used with various modifications to shorten the process and ensure 
participant involvement throughout the rounds. Modified Delphi methods are particularly prevalent in health 
and policy research [32]. Benefits of the Delphi method include: panel members remain anonymous to one 
another, reducing the potential for influence or bias throughout the rounds; it suits groups that are 
geographically distant; information and opinions are gained from a wide range of experts; and importantly, the 
process ensures that key stakeholders are involved from the beginning, which can assist future policies or 
programs that may be developed from the results.  
This paper reports on the first round of the modified Delphi with the panel of safety leaders. The interviews 
followed a semi-structured format consisting of open-ended questions about various aspects of safety culture. 
The questions were based on the key issues identified in the literature review, including defining safety culture, 
key factors for a positive safety culture, and barriers to creating and maintaining safety culture.    
Participants 
Interviewees were 41 safety experts within the organisation selected based on their current job position, relevant 
experience or through a peer nomination process. They were nominated by an organizational contact based on 
the above criteria developed by the researcher. In total 48 people were invited to participate and 41 completed 
interviews, representing an 85.4% response rate. Participants were recruited from various sites and divisions 
across the organisation, and all interviewees thought that safety was a significant part of their role. The 
breakdown of the participants roles were as follows: 3 Senior Executives; 6 Alliance Project Managers; 11 
Project Managers; 10 Safety Managers; 3 Corporate Managers; 3 Construction Managers; 1 Zone Manager; 1 
Building Manager; 1 Site Manager; 1 Operations Manager: and 1 Plant Manager. The majority (93%) of 
interviewees were male, approximating the typical gender split within the Australian construction industry.  
Procedure 
Safety experts from within the organisation participated in voluntary interviews about their understanding and 
perceptions of safety culture. A combination of face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews were 
conducted by the researcher over a three month period in 2010.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 11 
participants in private office spaces in the organization’s premises.  The rest of the participants were interviewed 
via telephone during business hours at a mutually convenient time.  Participation was voluntary and verbal 
consent was obtained from all participants.  Participants were informed of the confidentiality of the interview, 
and the anonymity of their responses. The participants were interviewed individually to elicit responses free 
from any group bias.  Interviews lasted between 20 and 60 minutes.  The first 14 interviews were recorded and 
transcribed as verbatim records and transcriptions were provided to the interviewees to confirm their accuracy.  
Following this, the rest of the interviews were recorded by the same researcher in note form, including verbatim 
quotes for key points. It was considered that full transcripts were not required beyond the first 14 interviewees, 
as saturation was being reached and the researcher was able to sufficiently capture confirmatory and/or 
contradictory themes in note form during the interviews.     
In the interviews, participants were asked to respond to questions about the key issues drawn from the literature 
review and informal interviews with industry representatives. The questions were open-ended to solicit broad 
responses to questions about safety culture in their organisation.  
Data Analysis 
The interview responses were analysed through a qualitative thematic analysis process. Braun and Clark (2006) 
consider thematic analysis a foundational method in qualitative analysis. They argue that its flexibility makes it 
a useful research tool, providing a rich and detailed account of the data. However, qualitative research is also 
notoriously misused in research (Silverman, 2006) and in particular, the approach is criticised as lacking rigour 
and transparency. To counter these limitations, a number of processes were followed.  
The first step in the analysis process was to organise the data from each participant into broad categories of 
interest, aligning to the interview questions. These categories were then examined for regularly occurring and 
key themes, and provided with codes relating to that theme. The data was also examined across the categories to 
identify any overarching themes. The identified themes are presented next.   
RESULTS 
The results described in this section were derived from thematic analysis of interviews, which were collected as 
the first round in a modified Delphi method. Key themes are discussed and supported under three categories of 
interest: defining and describing safety culture; key factors contributing to positive safety culture; and barriers to 
safety culture.  
Defining and describing safety culture  
In the interviews, the safety leaders were asked about how they defined and described safety culture. As can be 
seen in Table 1, the first major theme to emerge from the analysis was a focus on the practical side of safety 
culture, with many using action-oriented definitions and descriptions. Whilst values, beliefs and attitudes were 
mentioned by several interviewees, it seemed that most emphasis was placed on the actions, behaviours and 
practices of people in the organisation.  This was evidenced by responses that related to how things were done in 
the organisation and that safety culture is something created by the organisational members through their 
behaviours and actions. In particular, safety culture was understood to be largely created by the actions of 
influential organisational members, with interviewees commenting on how safety standards are reinforced by 
management.  This was further confirmed by additional responses that focused on how people acted when they 
weren’t being monitored by peers or management, reflecting the enduring qualities of culture.  
 




“The way we do things around here” 
“It’s what we do and say and execute in relation to safety” 
“Safety culture doesn’t invent itself, it is what comes out of the 
actions of people in the organisation” 
“The standard you walk past is the standard you set”  
“What people do when no-one’s looking” 
“What people do when you’re not there” 
Related to organisational 
culture 
“An aspect of general team culture, that relates to people’s 
attitudes towards safe work” 
“Safety culture is part of an organisational culture where safety is 
treated sacrosanct by the organisation” 
“I think that safety culture is a subset of organisational culture.... 
Safety is just one way an organisation expresses its culture”  
Implicit nature of culture “I don’t really use a definition of culture” 
“Culture is a funny word. It’s the way we do things and the way we 
think about things. But I’ve never really thought about it as 
culture” 
 
Another central theme to emerge from the results is the understanding of safety culture as a part of 
organisational culture. Definitions and descriptions of safety culture were often grounded as a component or a 
reflection of the broader culture. The strength of this theme is evidenced by a number of responses around safety 
leaders’ view of safety culture as an “aspect”, a “part” or a “sub-set” of the organisational culture or team 
culture. Some responses included a statement about the relative priority given to safety, for example, whether 
safety was “treated as sacrosanct”.  
The final theme to emerge in the safety leaders’ descriptions was around the implicit nature of safety culture. 
Many interviewees said that they did not use the term safety culture regularly, and did not have a working 
definition that they used. A common statement was that they “don’t really use a definition of safety culture”. 
Many preferred not to use the term culture, as it was considered by interviewees as too difficult to define. 
Another commented that they hadn’t really thought about it as culture, reflecting the intangible qualities of 
culture and particularly the difficulty of viewing one’s own group in terms of cultural descriptions.  
Key factors contributing to positive safety culture 
Another interview topic related to what the safety leaders thought were the key factors contributing to safety 
culture. The first theme to emerge from the data was around leadership commitment. Emphasis was placed on 
leaders demonstrating their commitment, in particular through high visibility to project sites, and through 
personalised actions and stories around safety. However some interviewees cautioned about commitment being 
genuine and with a practical focus, as cynicism towards senior leaders was talked about as reasonably common 
in the organisation. This extended to site practices as well, with responses indicating that safety culture should 
be reflected in processes and practices in project work. Responses within this theme also reflected an emphasis 
on the supervisory level as key to positive safety culture. It was viewed as a “pinch point” that facilitated 
successful implementation of safety practices.   
A related theme to emerge from the data was around safety communication. The main points raised in relation to 
safety communication were around clarity and simplicity. Interviewees felt that messages that were too complex 
were not effectively translated through the organisational levels. The various forms of communication were also 
mentioned, with slogans and visual communication tools such as posters being frequently cited as evidence of 
safety culture on site. The communication of leaders was also reflected in this theme, with their ability to 
effectively communicate the organisation’s vision, values, expectations and standards around safety seen as 
critical for positive safety culture.   
Another central theme to emerge in relation to factors contributing to positive safety culture was around worker 
involvement, engagement and participation in safety. It was recognised that safety culture, whilst driven by the 
leaders in the organisation, was largely a result of how the workforce thinks and acts in relation to safety. 
Emphasis was placed on getting everyone involved, and encouraging people to participate in the organisation’s 
safety agenda. The responses indicated that worker engagement in safety was considered vital to the overall 
safety effort, and interviewees talked about various methods for this, such as inductions, toolbox talks, videos, 
and workshops. Many interviewees also spoke about the involvement of workers in the improvement of safety 
processes and systems, with a focus on utilising their knowledge of the working conditions. In terms of safety 
education and competency, interviewees emphasised on-the-job training, coaching and mentoring as effective 
ways to engage workers in safety culture.  
Another key theme to emerge in the interviews was around the organisation having defined safety 
accountabilities for different roles. Several interviewees felt that it was important to clearly define and articulate 
safety accountabilities at all levels in the organisation, and for senior leaders to make sure that people are taking 
personal accountability for safety. Reward and recognition was also tied to this theme, evidenced by responses 
around there being consequences for both positive and negative actions. Others suggested that safety 
performance should be a factor in both selecting and promoting employees. Rewards were not only considered 
in a monetary sense, and many managers said they use positive incentives such as prize draws and certificates to 
encourage safe behaviours, as well as a recognition that intrinsic motivations were important for some workers.  
A final theme to emerge from the data around safety culture factors was about safety systems and processes 
being simple. The responses indicated that systems need to be streamlined in order to integrate safety processes 
with other business activities, and support cultural values. The concept of systems was considered quite broadly 
as the safety management system as a whole, including the processes involved in meeting legislative 
requirements and providing a safety workplace. Of those responses relating to systems as a part of the culture 
(rather than viewing them as parallel to culture, or as a pre-condition for culture), there was an emphasis on 
ensuring resources were devoted to systems to show that the organisation was ‘serious’ about safety.  
 







“It’s very simple and it’s exceptionally difficult. I think the thing 
that makes the biggest difference is for people on the ground to see 
people at the top talking to them about it.” 
“It’s important to these guys to see their bosses because then they 
will work hard for them and it drives performance.” 
“You have to be seen, do what you said you would do, and what 
you would expect others to do.”   
“The frontline supervisor is critical for implementation. It’s the 
people under his control are the ones that get injured. If he’s not 
on board, then no matter how much effort you put in at leadership 
level, it’s going to fail at that pinch point.”   
Safety communication “It’s no good having the best systems in the world if you can’t 
communicate information effectively.” 
“Messages are already fairly diluted once they get to the 
paddock”. 
“Not all things are important, [we need to] identify the critical few 
things that are important.” 
Workers’ involvement “Everyone in the organisation needs to live and feel the values” 
“It’s really important for the guys to get involved. And the right 
guys, the passionate ones, the ones who see how safety impacts on 
them.” 
“[We] need to be more hands on with the guys. Videos are good, 
but more during the job.” 
Defined safety 
accountabilities  
“You need accountability to make it happen. Any culture needs to 
have an element of fear around law and respect. If you take the 
Australian culture everybody knows you have to be a law abiding 
citizen to live within the Australian culture, and there are 
consequences if you step outside the cultural norm. I think it’s 
exactly the same with safety culture.” 
“Actions have consequences – positive actions have positive 
consequences and negative actions have negative consequences.”  
Simple safety systems  “I think safety culture is significantly enhanced when there is 
simplicity in terms of process and framework for the safety system” 
“Simplify the systems – make them work for you instead of you 
working for them” 
 
Barriers to safety culture 
The organisational safety leaders were also interviewed about what they thought were barriers to both creating 
and maintaining safety culture in the organisation. Table 3 provides an overview of the key themes and 
examples from the interviews. The first major theme to emerge was around competing business priorities, 
including production and cost pressures, and workload and time pressures. One interviewee’s comments on 
safety being an add-on, with “perceived time and cost implications” reflected this theme by displaying how 
safety is viewed as an extra activity on top of usual business, rather than something that is integrated in existing 
business activities. The benefits of operating safely were seen as less tangible than the benefits of meeting 
production outputs and time/cost charts. The responses indicated that middle management felt production and 
cost pressures the most, and that the organisation needed to support managers and supervisors in managing their 
workload, and ensuring safety is included when scoping roles. The strength of this theme is evidenced by 
responses about the compromising of safety in order to meet production pressures. This was further confirmed 
by additional responses that maintaining safety awareness was a barrier to safety culture, and that it was 
important to keep it alive and avoid being complacent about safety risks when other issues are more pressing. 
Another central theme to emerge in relation to barriers to safety culture was around workforce issues. These 
included the transience of the subcontractor workforce and the difficulties of managing individual differences. 
Subcontractor management was a significant barrier raised by many interviewees, not only in relation to the 
short work periods they perform, but also in terms of having to deal with cultural integration and competency 
gaps. Responses indicated that some safety leaders thought this issue increased risks on projects, and was seen 
as a significant barrier to safety culture in recent years and into the future. Also related to the theme of 
workforce issues were individual differences amongst the workers.  Responses recognised that people are 
different, and that different educational methods are required to get the safety culture message across. However, 
some safety leaders thought that education wasn’t enough to change some workers’ behaviours, and that 
ultimately safety decisions will be made by individuals and they might not always be the right decisions.    
The third theme to emerge from the data around safety culture barriers was in relation to the change process 
itself, including the amount and pace of change and putting things into practice. Responses indicated that the 
safety leaders felt the organisation was experiencing exponential growth and fast changes in both the workforce 
and organisational systems, and that this hindered positive cultural development. Other responses in relation to 
the change process theme suggested that the some changes were not happening quickly enough, particularly in 
relation to operationalising safety culture initiatives.  
The final theme to emerge from the interviews with safety leaders related to industry barriers. These included 
issues around legislative complexity, a poor regulatory system for the industry and competition issues with other 
construction companies.  Responses suggested that there was a concern about the organisation’s safety goals not 
being supported by the legislative and regulatory systems for the industry. The legislative requirements around 
safety were viewed as complex and requiring a lot of ‘paperwork’. The impact was perceived to stretch to 
internal systems, that many felt were further complicating legislative requirements, and were not sufficiently 
integrated into other organisational processes. Within this theme, responses also reflected a concern about the 
company’s competitiveness within the industry, as other companies who did not have the same safety standards 
could potentially win more work if evaluated on a cost basis.  
Table 3. Themes associated with barriers to safety culture  
Theme and sub-themes Examples 
Competing business priorities 
 
- Production and cost 
pressures 
 





- Maintaining a high level 
of awareness 
“We live in a life where safety is an add-on, rather than a part of 
doing business. That means that there are perceived time and cost 
implications.”  
“The issue is middle management – they still feel the pressures of 
production and cost. They need to participate in it [safety 
culture].” 
 “People become daunted by the volume of what is required. They 
become overwhelmed and can’t see where to start. We need to 
help them see where to start by prioritising issues and providing 
support.” 
 “The reality is that compromises are made when the pressure is 
on.” 
“It’s hard to keep it as a priority – I find it hard – because there’s 
so much else on.” 
Workforce issues 
- Subcontractor transience  
- Individual differences 
 
 
“It’s like you’re starting from scratch all the time.” 
 “Each individual thinks about safety in a different way” 
“A common barrier is employee behaviour – people still willing 
to put themselves at risk. We provide all the encouragement and 
guidance and everything under the sun but sometime will still 
make a decision to do it a different way” 
The change process 








“Culture takes a while to build, and it takes a while for that 
culture to mature.  If you are forever changing the leadership, the 
systems, the expectations or the values, the culture never has time 
to embed itself and mature. It generally just stays as more 
reactive.” 
“The issue is in changing from theory to practice” 
“Everyone is saying the right things but we’re just not seeing 
things getting done, it’s taking too long. Give us the tools - we 
want to do it, not just talk about it” 
Industry issues 
- Legislative complexity  
 
 




- Competitive nature of 
industry 
 
“One of the biggest barriers I see is with the system that has been 
created to manage safety on big projects like this is, trying to 
comply with the multitudes of standards, regs, governing bodies, 
federal bodies. And they are constantly changing expectations 
and goalposts.” 
“It is a big call to ask [the company] to be a leader on this on 
their own. It would be much easier if all the big construction 
companies could come on board or if we had a similar regulatory 
system [as the oil and mining industries]”. 
“The building business is competitive and we compete against 
people who don’t have the same safety standards as us” 
 “Will [the company] still win work if we are more expensive?” 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to explore how safety culture is understood and described by experts in a large Australian 
construction organisation, and to determine the key factors and barriers to safety culture as understood by the 
organisation’s safety leaders. It is argued that this process is critical in providing a foundation for a relevant and 
practical safety culture change program, and in engaging the key stakeholders early in the change process.    
The key themes identified in the safety leaders’ definitions and descriptions of safety culture highlight that their 
understanding of safety culture related to the actions and behaviours of the workforce, and in particular how 
people acted in their normal mode of operation. The descriptions also recognised the link between safety culture 
and the organisation’s broader culture. Given the nature of the construction industry, and the dominant 
disciplines within it – engineers, project managers, and construction workers – it is not surprising that the 
tangible components of complex concepts such as culture are given emphasis. The implication of this is that 
many theory-based definitions of safety culture may not be understood and accepted in practice, and having 
simple and practical messages about safety was important to the safety leaders in this sample.  
The key themes identified in the safety leaders’ understanding of the safety culture factors revealed that, 
consistent with the literature, leadership was identified as a key factor for positive safety culture in the 
organisation, and there was an emphasis on leaders demonstrating commitment to safety, and being visible to 
the project-based workforce. Also consistent with the literature was an emphasis on effective communication 
and worker’s involvement in safety. Perhaps less obvious in the literature but clear in this sample was the theme 
around simple safety systems being critical to supporting cultural goals.  This could reflect current 
organisational maturity around safety; however the point is relevant in the consideration of practical applications 
of safety culture and supporting systems.    
The key themes identified in the safety leaders’ perceptions of barriers to safety culture identified a number of 
issues that were viewed as significant to the development and maintenance of safety culture, and are likely to 
impact upon safety culture initiatives within the organisation. The company has built its reputation on its ‘can-
do attitude’ to projects, and this has commonly been interpreted as a high production focus. Managers are now 
trying to re-interpret this as a ‘can-do safely’ approach to construction works, but there are clearly some 
perceived contradictions with this. The safety leaders raised diverse issues such as the transient subcontractor 
workforce, legislative and regulatory difficulties, and the challenge of maintaining safety awareness under high 
production pressures. Whilst these barriers may not be possible to overcome in the short term, their impact can 
be lessened if they are identified early in the change process.   
The key strength and limitation in this study is the chosen sample. The strength of the sample is that the 
interviewees were recognised safety leaders within the organisation, and were in a position to provide expert 
opinion on their understanding of safety culture. Of course, this also means that caution must be exercised in 
generalising the results to other organisations of varying sizes and regions, and to other industries. Another point 
is that the perceptions of the general workforce were not explored in this study, and it will be important to 
compare responses to check if the current data was affecting by social desirability biases within the management 
group.   
In conclusion, the research presented in this paper is unique in that it derived safety culture descriptions from 
key stakeholders within a large Australian construction organisation, as opposed to imposing traditional 
conceptualisations of safety culture that are not customised for the organisation or the construction industry 
more broadly. The results from this study will form the foundation for integrating safety culture theory and 
practice into guidelines for the Australian construction industry. Future research will include completing the 
second modified Delphi round with the same panel of experts and then using the combined findings to inform a 
larger workforce survey within the organisation.  
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